Abstract (The issue of the effective transfer of the political and administrative capital to Yamoussoukro (Ivory Coast): 1983-2017)
Kouakou Didié Kouadio§
Summary: The political and administrative capital of Côte d'Ivoire since March 21, 1983, Yamoussoukro is still awaiting the transfer of state institutions. What are the obstacles to the transfer of state institutions to Yamoussoukro? The study aims to show that the effective transfer of the capital to Yamoussoukro is hampered by a lack of political will and by a land issue. The study uses both written and oral sources. It highlights a hasty transfer law. It also highlights the existence of a thorny land issue that is preventing the demarcation of the Administrative and Political Zone and the purging of land rights. It also shows that the dissolution of the transfer program largely contributed to the failure to transfer the capital to Yamoussoukro.
Keywords: Administration, capital, politics, transfer, Yamoussoukro.
Abstract: The political and administrative capital of Côte d'Ivoire since March 21, 1983, Yamoussoukro is still awaiting the transfer of state institutions. What are the obstacles to the transfer of state institutions to Yamoussoukro? The study aims to show that the effective transfer from the capital to Yamoussoukro is hampered by a lack of political will and a land question. The study uses written and oral sources. It highlights a law of hasty transfer. Moreover, it stresses the existence of a thorny land problem that prevents the delimitation of the Administrative and Political Zone and the purging of land rights. It also shows that the dissolution of the transfer programme is a major factor in the failure of the transfer from the capital to Yamoussoukro.
Keywords: Administration, capital, politics, transfer, Yamoussoukro.
Introduction
Writings on the city of Yamoussoukro are not lacking in scientific relevance. However, the interest in focusing on the problem of the transfer of the political and administrative capital of Côte d'Ivoire is well worth a closer look. Located in the center of Côte d'Ivoire, Yamoussoukro has an exceptional geographical position. It is crossed by the A3 national highway, which links Côte d'Ivoire to neighboring countries such as Mali and Burkina Faso. Two-thirds of the country's traffic passes through it. Yamoussoukro has sixteen (16) districts. Its population is predominantly Baoulé Akouè. It also includes a number of non-natives from various regions of Côte d'Ivoire. As a crossroads town, it is home to a large non-native community, mainly from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Numerous rivers and streams run through the town, with low-lying areas used for rice and market gardening. The town boasts several lakes, two of which attract numerous visitors every year.
On the strength of its assets and geographical position, Yamoussoukro was chosen as the political and administrative capital by decree no. 83 of March 21, 1983.[1]. However, the institutions remained in Abidjan. Hopes of an effective transfer of the capital, raised by the Programme Spécial de Transfert de la Capitale à Yamoussoukro (PSTCY), turned to disappointment in 2012. On that date, the promulgation of decree n°2012-02 of January 09, 2012[2] put an end to the program to transfer the capital to Yamoussoukro.
Examples of the transfer of political and administrative capitals from one city to another abound throughout the world. In West Africa, Nigeria has succeeded in establishing its new capital in Abuja, replacing Lagos. Like Lagos, Abidjan's population is soaring. Its population rose from 300,000 in 1960 to 1,000,000 in 1976 and 1,800,000 in 1982 (Kodjo 1). Faced with the urgency of the situation, Yamoussoukro was chosen to take on the role of political and administrative capital in 1983. Thirty-eight years after the capital transfer law was passed, all political and administrative institutions remain based in Abidjan. So what are the obstacles to the effective transfer of state institutions to Yamoussoukro?
The study aims to show that the effective transfer of the capital to Yamoussoukro is hampered by a lack of political will and by a land issue. To resolve the main question, the methodology used is based on the analysis of printed sources, oral sources, electronic sources, iconographic sources and documents from documentation centers. The approach to the subject is global and above all chronological. The analysis is structured in three parts: a hasty law transferring the political and administrative capital, the land question, the dissolution of the Capital Transfer Program in Yamoussoukro and its consequences.
Map 1: The city of Yamoussoukro
Source: Kouadio Kouakou Didié based on Urbanplan, 2015.
1. A hasty law to transfer the political and administrative capital (1983-1997)
In the midst of an economic crisis since the early 80s, Côte d'Ivoire decided to establish its new political and administrative capital in Yamoussoukro. Despite the justifications, the law transferring the capital was contested. The worsening of the economic crisis in 1987 led to restrictive measures, including the abandonment of the project to transfer the capital to the State.
1.1. The controversial choice of Yamoussoukro as political and administrative capital
Capital of Côte d'Ivoire since 1933, Abidjan is the country's largest city. It owes its prosperity to the opening of the port in 1950 (Brou 289). At the end of the colonial era, Abidjan's population was growing at a frenetic pace, making it a crowded capital. The population rose from 300,000 in 1960 to 1,800,000 in 1982 (Kodjo 2). With a view to relieving congestion in Abidjan and enabling a new redeployment of the national rural development policy, law no. 83-242 of March 21, 1983[3] made Yamoussoukro the new political and administrative capital of Côte d'Ivoire. Prior to its adoption by the National Assembly, the bill was adopted by the Economic and Social Council (CES) at its extraordinary session on February 02, 1983. For the CES, approval of the bill supported the desire of all social strata to see the capital transferred to Yamoussoukro. However, some voices were raised to contest the bill and then the law itself. Within the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), some deputies consider the law ill-advised. Semi Bi Zan, for example, does not see the merits of this decision at a time when Côte d'Ivoire is facing numerous difficulties (Akrou 10). Moreover, he finds complacent the motions of support that have poured in from all quarters. His remarks were well-founded, all the more so as, since the world oil crisis of 1978, commodity prices had plummeted. This has led to galloping inflation, a weak education system and low purchasing power in Côte d'Ivoire. This situation was exacerbated in rural areas by drought and its corollary of bush fires. "Under the one-party regime, the Ivorian parliament appeared to be a recording chamber for the president's will." (Kouadio 72)
For his part, Laurent Gbagbo considers Houphouët-Boigny's choice of Yamoussoukro as the country's capital to be contrary to republican ethics. He believes that the choice of Yamoussoukro is akin to an egocentric policy and decentralization tinged with regionalization. The urban nature of Yamoussoukro and the origins of two of the players involved in this choice raise suspicions. On the one hand, in 1983, Yamoussoukro was a city under construction, with no specific function to serve as a base for the new capital. The city had no industrial facilities, and agriculture remained the population's main economic activity. Of course, the predominance of agricultural activity over industrial and commercial activities is quite typical of African villages. As a result, Yamoussoukro is more akin to a large village than a town. What's more, Yamoussoukro is orphaned of certain essential government departments, notably Justice, Customs and Taxation. "Houphouët-Boigny wanted to distance his village from a repressive function and turn it into a tax haven" (Dubresson and Jaglin 6). Yet these different administrations play an essential role in the running of a modern city. On the other hand, the regionalism referred to by Laurent Gbagbo stems from the Baoulé origins of the two main actors in the March 21, 1983 law. The President of the Republic is Baoulé Akouè, Yamoussoukro's indigenous ethnic group. He was the initiator of the law transferring the capital. Like him, Konian Kodjo, Vice-President of the Economic and Social Council, is also a native of Yamoussoukro. His cousin Jean Konan Banny is a member of the Côte d'Ivoire government. At his invitation, the members of the Council adopted in extraordinary session the draft bill on the transfer of the capital to Yamoussoukro. In this respect, doubts remain as to the credibility of their action. Beyond the polemics surrounding the choice of Yamoussoukro, there is an investment problem.
1.2. The State's inability to invest
During the first two decades of independence, Côte d'Ivoire enjoyed miraculous economic growth, soon interrupted by an unprecedented economic crisis. In June 1987, it officially declared insolvency (Bamba et al. 11). The economic orientation chosen by the Ivorian government was to base the country's success on agriculture. With this in mind, priority was given to exporting the main raw materials: coffee and cocoa. Clearly, such an economic choice creates dependence on world commodity prices. It was a risky choice, for which the country paid dearly in the 1980s. In 1978, with the global oil crisis, Côte d'Ivoire's trading partners tried to achieve economic recovery by reducing external spending. With the market subject to the law of supply and demand, commodity prices plummeted. Growth went from -4.06% in 1987 to -4.61% in 1990 (Labonté 18). Poverty gained ground. It affected not only purchasing power, but also quality of life. The national poverty rate rose rapidly between 1985 and 1995, from 10% to 36%. Poverty does not only affect the population. It also affects the Ivorian state. The facts :
Although public spending continued to fall, the public deficit rose to 16.5% of GDP in 1989 and 12% in 1993, while budget revenues fell by more than 8 points of GDP (from 25.7% in 1986 to 17.5% of GDP in 1993). This was due as much to the fall in business activity as to the cessation of the levy on agricultural exports, as the producer price was maintained despite the decline in coffee and cocoa prices (Cogneau and Mesple-Somps 18).
Given the sharp fall in GDP, problems of income distribution and poverty were relegated to the background. Investment fell from 42.3% in 1990-1991 to 24.1% in 1994-1995 (Labonté 21).
In addition to the economic crisis, Côte d'Ivoire is facing three major crises that are having a considerable impact on its economy, notably deforestation due to the bush fires of 1983, land scarcity and the collapse of world terms of trade for coffee and cocoa (Kipré 242). Above all, it was subject to the measures of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Structural Adjustment Program. The 1990-1992 program focused mainly on increasing the tax burden and restructuring state-owned companies. Despite improvements in public finances and the banking sector, the country was unable to repay its debt and cover public expenditure. Against this backdrop of economic gloom, the level of public investment has fallen considerably, from 25.6% to 4.2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Investment has fallen sharply. By way of illustration, they represented only 10% of GDP in 1983, 4% in 1987 and 2.8% in 1991 (Kipré 245). Under such conditions, investments to transfer the political and administrative capital to Yamoussoukro could not be carried out. Yamoussoukro has no buildings capable of housing state institutions. Apart from the Presidency of the Republic, there are no administrative buildings capable of housing the various ministries. Furthermore, the law of March 21, 1983 makes no provision for the Parliament, the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Council to be housed in such buildings. What's more, the World Bank has imposed a reorientation of public investment flows towards the education and health sectors, to the detriment of funding for infrastructure and major public companies. As a result, there has been total silence on the effective transfer of Côte d'Ivoire's political and administrative capital to Yamoussoukro. To correct the shortcomings of the 1983 law, a 1997 decree established an Administrative and Political Zone in Yamoussoukro. However, land tenure problems prevented its implementation.
2. The land issue: a real obstacle to implementing the 1997 law
Land tenure is a major issue in Côte d'Ivoire. In the west of the country, the development of cocoa and coffee plantations is creating pressure on land tenure, with its corollary of inter-community clashes. The 1997 law transferring the capital to Yamoussoukro brought to light latent land conflicts, such as the confusion surrounding land ownership and the problems of purging land rights and compensation.
2.1. Confusion surrounding land ownership in the Administrative and Political Zone
Once an inalienable asset, land is now the subject of transactions. As a result, it is at the heart of conflicts between village communities. Yamoussoukro is a perfect illustration. With the promulgation of decree n°97-177 of March 19 1997[4]a problem of land ownership arose concerning the Administrative and Political Zone (ZAP). Occupying an area of 6,400 ha, ownership of the land to be allocated to it pits several village communities against each other. For example, N'Gokro is opposed to Kpangbassou, and Kacou Broukro to Bézro. The village of Kpangbassou was founded by the N'Zikpli from Didiévi after land was granted to them by their hosts from N'Gokro. Similarly, Kacou Broukro came into conflict with Bézro. As part of the construction of the Kossou dam, the inhabitants of the latter village were resettled on Kacou Broukro land. On the causes of these conflicts, Kouassi Yao Maurice[5] points out that the traditional and historic holders of the land were not involved upstream in the preliminary surveys, requests for information or any form of consultation. His point of view is also shared by the Yamoussoukro landowners' association. In reality, Kpangbassou and Bézro are the legal beneficiaries of the property rights. However, customarily, these lands belong respectively to their hosts in N'Gokro and Kacou Broukro. In this case, the host villages and the ZAP villages must make concessions in the name of hospitality and recognition. The upstream cause of the property conflicts induced by the operation to identify and demarcate urban and peri-urban village terroirs is a problem of who is entitled to any compensation from the State. In addition to this cause, it should be noted that there are no industries. This situation is the result of Félix Houphouët-Boigny's desire to make his city a green capital. As a result, agriculture is the population's main economic activity. The ZAP alone covers 6400 ha. By swallowing up arable land, it poses a threat to the agricultural sector. This is the situation faced by the people of Kpangbassou and Bézro. It is only logical that they should protest against the expropriation of their farmland, and fiercely oppose its eviction.
In principle, the urbanization of agricultural land must be accompanied by the purging of customary land rights. The ZAP occupies a peri-urban area that constitutes a land transition zone. It is therefore a place of confrontation between two logics: one customary and the other modern. The logic of the instrumentalization of land by public authorities is opposed by the logic of the land patrimoniality of local populations (Kra 275-276). In anticipation of the relocation of their villages, the local population regularly assaults the space reserved for state institutions. The Kpangbassou site is earmarked for the construction of the Senate, while the Bézro site is to house the Nature Museum (Yapi and Brou 190). In addition, the need for expansion has prompted residents, who have been confined to the same area since 1997, to build housing estates. All these hijackings of the ZAP are taking place in full view of the Yamoussoukro administrative authorities. The administration's silence is partly due to the lack of compensation and purging of landowners.
2.2. The question of compensation and purging customary rights
Indemnification is financial compensation intended to repair a loss suffered by third parties. In the context of a declaration of public interest, it should, in principle, be paid to the holders of property titles. Such a perception of compensation poses a problem. Indeed, in all African societies, land is a collective, sacred and inalienable asset (Kouadio 118). The establishment of a land title under these conditions is subject to the agreement of the members of the lineage. In Yamoussoukro, the confusion surrounding ownership of the ZAP is complicating compensation for landowners. To date, the State has found it difficult to identify the true landowners, given the conflicts between the villages settled on the urbanization perimeter and their hosts over land. The demarcation of village terroirs, in order to facilitate compensation, should not have taken longer than four (04) months. However, due to its complexity, until 2007, not all disputes had been settled. The complexity lies in the fact that, in theory, the delimitation appears simple. In practice, administrative certainties are outweighed by vagueness. Natural borders hardly exist any more. Even when they do exist, they are still not universally accepted.[6]. This makes drawing boundaries a tedious business. Compensation for landowners in the ZAP is closely linked to the purging of customary rights.
Purging is a formality designed to free a property or estate from a charge that encumbers it to its owners. In Côte d'Ivoire, every piece of land belongs to a village community. The erection of Yamoussoukro as a political and administrative capital and, consequently, the declaration of its perimeter as being in the public interest, requires the purging of customary rights. In fact, any transfer of land requires libations. Through these, landowners obtain the agreement of Mother Earth for the success of the activity to be carried out on the acquired land (Babo and Droz 745). For this to happen, the purge must first be paid in full. Just like the compensation operation, this is quite problematic. Disputes over property rights and land boundaries are commonplace, especially in Kpangbassou. Moreover, the declaration of public utility makes the State the owner of the land located in the ZAP. In this respect, the populations affected must receive fair compensation. Nevertheless, since 1997, the year of the declaration of public utility, the only purges of land rights have been for the construction of the Hôtel des Députés (Parliament building).[7]. According to Baba Sylla[8]a former Member of Parliament and son of the village of Nanan, out of a total purge of 96,500,000 FCFA, 65,000,000 FCFA have been paid to landowners on the basis of 1,500 FCFA/m2. Landowners are still waiting for the remainder of the purge, as well as compensation for the entire ZAP. Numerous unfavorable circumstances explain the delays in payment. The annual State budgets for 2005 and 2006 show that the Programme Spécial de Transfert de la Capitale à Yamoussoukro (PSTCY) received two cumulative allocations of 165,000,000 FCFA for purging operations. This sum was to be used to effectively purge customary rights on the site of the Hôtel des Députés. However, the slowness and cumbersomeness of the public administration compromised its realization. The funds were lost because they were not used within the allotted time.
In the absence of property purge rights and compensation, local people live off the exploitation of the ZAP. Clandestine housing estates such as the one at Kpangbassou are being built there (Yapi and Koffi 189). Yao rightly maintains that in Yamoussoukro, "certain plots of land earmarked for facilities or green spaces have often changed hands without having been the subject of a declassification procedure" (32). The truth is that the land in the ZAP is coveted by the village communities of Kpangbassou and Bézro. These two villages believe that the need for expansion is pushing them to create subdivisions, since since 1997, the inhabitants have been confined to the same site, while the village community has been growing. The truth is that, having been deprived of their cultivated land and not yet having benefited fully from the compensation received for their eviction, the two villages feel the need to generate substantial income. The dissolution of the Programme Spécial de Transfert de la Capitale à Yamoussoukro (Special Programme for the Transfer of the Capital to Yamoussoukro) only aggravates the situation of the village communities and increases the threat of subdivisions of the ZAP.
3. The dissolution of the Special Programme for the Transfer of the Capital to Yamoussoukro and its consequences (PSTCY): 2012-2017
Established by decree n°2002-483 of October 30, 2002, the PSTCY appears to be the only attempt to effectively transfer the political and administrative capital to Yamoussoukro. Despite his campaign promises to transfer the capital, the President of the Republic, Alassane Ouattara, sealed Yamoussoukro's fate by dissolving the PSTCY in 2012.
3.1. Dissolution of PSTCY
Concerned about the need to relieve traffic congestion in Abidjan, President Laurent Gbagbo created the Programme Spécial de Transfert de la Capitale à Yamoussoukro (PSTCY) on October 30, 2002.[9]. This structure is placed under the technical supervision of the Ministry in charge of Relations with Institutions. It comprises the Comité Interministériel de Transfert de la Capitale (CIMTC), the Comité de Pilotage et de Suivie (CPS) and the Unité d'Exécution du Programme (UEP). The PSTCY has autonomous management. In its implementation, it encounters difficulties due to a number of dysfunctions. Firstly, the lack of collaboration between the various players involved in the transfer process quickly led to a conflict of competence. Secondly, this unfavorable environment for the progress of the PSTCY was compounded by recurrent dysfunctions in the program's governing bodies, namely the Interministerial Committee and the Steering and Monitoring Committee. These bodies rarely met. Thirdly, the administrative Commission for the purging of customary rights proved ineffective, especially as many land disputes remained unresolved. Alongside all these obstacles, funding problems have arisen due to insufficient annual budgetary appropriations. The main problem is the low level of disbursements. By way of example, the first phase of the capital transfer investments was estimated at 2,800,000,000,000 FCFA over ten years. However, the cumulative amount obtained from the 2003 to 2009 budgets is 15,000,000,000 FCFA, or 0.5% of the amount estimated over seven years of operation.[10]. Under these conditions, the dysfunctions combined with the low level of funding are not conducive to the realization of the capital transfer project. In fact, this situation is due to the politico-military crisis, which is not conducive to the acquisition of sufficient funds to complete the project. In view of these dysfunctions, the PSTCY has come in for a great deal of criticism. With a view to remedying these difficulties, Laurent Gbagbo signed decree n°2010-646 on April 8, 2010.
Contrary to his campaign promises, President Alassane Ouattara puts an end to PSTCY activities[11]. The related bodies were attached to the Office of the President of the Republic. Although the organs of the former PSTCY were attached to the services of the Presidency, no action was taken to resume the work of the ZAP. This attitude is indicative of a lack of political will. Indeed, since he came to power, all the major construction sites in Yamoussoukro have remained closed. In fact, the first finance bill for 2012 makes no mention of funding for construction projects in the political and administrative capital. Furthermore, his decision to dissolve the PSTCY is more akin to a desire to break with the projects of former President Laurent Gbagbo. In his seven years in office, no action has been taken to transfer the country's institutions to Yamoussoukro. The proliferation of investments in Abidjan to the detriment of Yamoussoukro reflects the president's determination not to transfer the capital.
3.2. Abandonment of the Yamoussoukro worksites and extension of the presidential palace offices
The decree of January 09 officially sanctions the closure of the Yamoussoukro construction sites. The photo below clearly illustrates the cessation of construction work on the administrative buildings.
Photography 1 : The National Assembly under construction, abandoned
In the picture, you can see that the vegetation around the building is very abundant. It consists of grasses and shrubs. The building is indeed in a savannah zone. If it had been in a forested area, it would have been difficult to see the walls. The site was abandoned ten years ago. The unfinished building has a "U"-shaped architecture. Such architecture reflects the building's modern character. Judging by the number of floors and the length of the building, the National Assembly was intended to house several offices.
The consequence of this situation is that many sites intended to house administrative facilities or green spaces, such as the Palais de la Justice, the Maison de la Culture and the Maison des Expositions, are regularly attacked by landowners.
Alassane Ouattara's arrival in power has raised real hopes. As Baba Sylla explains[12]the President of the Republic's campaign promises had everything to reassure the people of Yamoussoukro. During the presidential campaign for the second round of voting, the President of the Republic promised that he would move to Yamoussoukro as soon as he was elected. The rehabilitation of the Ivorian Hemicycle has further contributed to the population's despair of ever seeing Yamoussoukro effectively assume the role of political and administrative capital of Côte d'Ivoire. It signals the definitive abandonment of the ZAP development project. At a time when the ZAP construction sites are being left to their own devices, Abidjan is undergoing a transformation thanks to the colossal investments being made in an already congested urban area. The image below illustrates the point.
Photo 2: The annex building of the Ivorian presidential palace
The picture shows a building being finished. The presence of cranes on the site indicates the continuity of the work. The building is scheduled for delivery in December 2021. However, the building's exterior cladding is proof that work is nearing completion. PFO stands for Pierre Fakhoury Operator. Pierre Fakhoury is an architect well known to Ivorians. He was the architect of major buildings in Yamoussoukro, notably the Fondation Félix Houphouët-Boigny pour la Recherche de la Paix and the Basilique Notre Dame de la Paix. President Alassane Ouattara's decision to invest so much in Abidjan clearly proves that the project to transfer the capital to Yamoussoukro is not part of his government's program. Examples include the construction of the Riviera interchange in 2012, the Treichville interchange in 2016, the third bridge in 2014 and the annex to the presidency of the republic. Part of these investments could have financed the gradual transfer of the political and administrative capital to Yamoussoukro.
Conclusion
A study of the issues involved in transferring the political and administrative capital to Yamoussoukro highlights a number of problems. The choice of Yamoussoukro, the birthplace of the President of the Republic, against a backdrop of economic crisis, did not allow the groundwork to be laid for the effective transfer of institutions. In addition, problems relating to land ownership, compensation and the purging of customary rights are major obstacles to be overcome before the Administrative and Political Zone can be equipped. The dissolution of the Special Program for the Transfer of the Capital to Yamoussoukro is undoubtedly one of the major problems facing the project to transfer the capital to Yamoussoukro. This ambitious program was interrupted at a time when construction work on the Parliament and Presidential Palace was well underway.
The study showed that the main obstacles to the effective transfer of the capital are political and land-related. On the one hand, the lack of political will can be seen in the systematic stoppage of construction work on the buildings that are to house the Parliament and the Presidential Palace. On the other hand, there is a lack of investment in Abidjan. As for land issues, they are a real stumbling block. It is imperative for the State to clear up all disputes with the villages in the Administrative and Political Zone, and resettle them on new sites before the effective transfer of the capital to Yamoussoukro.
Sources and works cited
Oral sources
| Full name | Age | Function | Survey date and location | Theme |
| Baba Sylla | 56 years old | International lawyer | June 20, 2021, in Yamoussoukro at 5:30 pm. | Purges of customary rights |
| Gado Pierre | 68 years old | village chief | June 18, 2021, in Kpangbassou at 3:23 p.m. | The aggressions of the Administrative and Political Zone |
| Kouassi Yao Maurice | 58 years old | Secretary of the N'Gokro chiefdom | June 15, 2021 at 10:50 a.m. in N'Gokro | Land ownership disputes |
Printed sources
Akrou, Jean-Baptiste. "Yamoussoukro, un center de décisions plus près des administrés -Les infrastructures existantes", Spécial An 23, Fraternité Matin, November 1983, p. 1-2.
JORCI, n°42 of May 22, 2010, Decree n°2010-646 of April 8, 2010, completing and modifying the decree of October 30, 2002.
JORCI n°24 of June 12, 1997, Décret n°97-177 of March 19, 1997 portant approbation et déclaration d'utilité publique du périmètre du projet d'urbanisation de la ville de Yamoussoukro.
JORCI, n°50 du 12 décembre 2002, Décret n°2002-483 du 3à octobre 2002, portant création, organisation et fonctionnement du Programme Spécial de Transfert de la Capitale à Yamoussoukro (PSTCY).
JORCI Spécial n°2, du 30 janvier 2012, Décret n°2012-02 du 09 janvier 2012 portant dissolution du Programme Spécial de Transfert de la Capitale à Yamoussoukro (PSTCY).
Kodjo, Konian. Report on the transfer of the political and administrative capital of Côte d'Ivoire to Yamoussoukro.
Electronic source
Works quoted
Babo, Alfred and Droz Yves. "Land conflicts. De l'ethnie à la nation. Rapport interethnique et " ivoirité "". Cahier d'Etudes Africaines, n°192, p. 741-764.
Bamba, N'Galadjo et al. "Crise économique et programme d'ajustement structurel en Côte d'Ivoire: Crise et ajustement en Côte d'Ivoire, les dimensions sociales et culturelles". Acte de table ronde, Bingerville, November 30-December 02, 1992.
Brou, N'Goran Alphonse. La contribution des capitales au développement socio-économique de la Côte d'ivoire : Les cas de Grand-Bassam, Bingerville et Abidjan de 1893 à 1983, Thèse de Doctorat Unique, Université Alassane Ouattara, 2018.
Cogneau, Denis and Mesple-Somps Sandrine. L'économie ivoirienne, la fin du mirage? Paris: DIAL, 2002.
Dubresson, Alain and Jaglin Stéphane. Gérer la ville du Prince : le difficile exercice communal à Yamoussoukro (Côte d'Ivoire), Université Paris X - Nanterre, 1993.
Kipre, Pierre. Côte d'Ivoire: La formation d'un peuple, Fontenay-sous-Bois: SIDES-IMA, 2005.
Kouadio, Kouakou Didié. "Obstacles to the development of a democratic culture in Côte d'Ivoire (1994-2016)". Sifoè, n°13, June 2020, pp. 70-80.
.......... "Baule migrants, natives, conflicts and integration in the Gagnoa region from 1928 to 1995". Godo Godo, n°33, 2019, p. 111-125.
Kra, Kouakou Valentin. Les stratégies de captation de l'espace des acteurs locaux dans la capitale administrative à Yamoussoukro, PhD thesis, University of Bouaké, 2011.
Labonte, Nathalie. La guerre civile en Côte d'Ivoire ; influences des facteurs économiques, politiques et identitaires, Master's thesis, Quebec, 2006.
Yapi, Atsé Calvin. "The transgression of urban planning tools in the city of Yamoussoukro (Côte d'Ivoire)". journal Ivoirienne de Géographie des savanes, n°5, December 2018, p. 180-193.
How to cite this article:
MLA: Kouadio, Kouakou Didié. "Problématique du transfert effectif de la capitale politique et administrative à Yamoussoukro (côte d'ivoire): 1983-2017." Uirtus 1.2. (December 2021): 543-560.
§ Université Alassane Ouattara / [email protected]
[1] JORCI of April 07, 1983, Law n°83-483 of March 21, 1983, transferring the political and administrative capital of Côte d'Ivoire to Yamoussoukro.
[2] JORCI of January 30, 2012, Decree n°2012-02 of January 09, 2012, dissolving the Programme Spécial de Transfert de la Capitale à Yamoussoukro.
[3] JORCI of April 07, 1983, Op. Cit.
[4] JORCI no. 24 of June 12, 1997, Decree no. 97-177 of March 19, 1997 approving and declaring in the public interest the perimeter of the Yamoussoukro urbanization project.
[5 ] Interview with Kouassi Yao Maurice, 58, Secretary of the N'Gokro chiefdom, on June 15, 2021 at 10:50 a.m. in N'Gokro.
[6] Interview with Gado Pierre, 68, chief of the village of Kpangbassou, on June 18, 2021, in Kpangbassou at 3:23 pm.
[7] Interview with Gado Pierre, 68 years old, chief of the village of Kpangbassou, on June 18, 2021, in Kpangbassou at 15h 23 mn.
[8] Interview with Baba Sylla, 56, international lawyer, on June 20, 2021, in Yamoussoukro, at 5:30 pm.
[9] JORCI, n°50 of December 12, 2002, Decree n°2002-483 of October 30, 2002, on the creation, organization and operation of the Special Capital Transfer Program in Yamoussoukro (PSTCY), p. 854
[10] JORCI, n°42 of May 22, 2010, Decree n°2010-646 of April 8, 2010, completing and modifying the decree of October 30, 2002.
[11] JORCI Spécial n°2, du 30 janvier 2012, Décret n°2012-02 du 09 janvier 2012 portant dissolution du Programme Spécial de Transfert de la Capitale à Yamoussoukro (PSTCY).
[12]Interview with Baba Sylla, 56, international lawyer, on June 20, 2021, in Yamoussoukro, at 5:30 pm.