Agnélé Lassey§
Abstract: The aim of this article is to show how the emergence and formation of this socio-professional category accentuated colonial domination in Togo from 1884 to 1946. Indeed, it appears that to mark their presence and keep the colonized populations in obedience, where an uprising could be feared, the colonial powers created a security force on the spot, enabling them to dominate and exercise their authority over the African populations. In Togo, the situation was no different either. Although their role was initially limited to the internal and external protection of the colony, the security forces eventually established themselves as an indispensable force.
Keywords: black force, war, troop, authority, security
Abstract: The objective of this article is to show how the emergence and the formation of this socio-professional category accentuated the colonial domination in Togo from 1884 to 1946. Indeed, it appears that to mark their presence and to keep in obedience the colonized populations of which one could fear an uprising, the colonial powers created a security force on the spot that could allow them to dominate and exercise their authority over the African populations. In Togo, the situation was not different either. Although initially their role was almost limited to the internal and external protection of the colony, law enforcement and security agents eventually established themselves as an indispensable force.
Keywords: dark force, war, troops, authority, security
Introduction
"Cannon fodder", "indigènes", "sans papiers", "la dette", "sans pension" etc. are all expressions used to designate the black overseas soldiers who helped maintain colonial domination. With devotion, bravery and loyalty, they served the colonial cause. In so doing, their participation in their country's colonial history is beyond doubt. Indeed, to mark their presence and keep the colonized populations in obedience, where an uprising was feared, the colonial powers created a military force on the spot that would enable them to dominate and exercise their authority over the African populations. Initially rather timid in the early days of the German colonial period, this force came into its own during the French colonial period.[1]a much more formal form, and thus became part of the colonial project. It would therefore be interesting to revisit their history in order to understand this black force, which served the colonial cause in Togo. This raises a fundamental question: how did the emergence and formation of the black forces support colonial actions in Togo between 1884 and 1946?
The aim of this article is to describe the process of emergence and formation of this black force, but also to show how its actions accentuated colonial domination in Togo. To achieve this goal, a wide range of documentation was used. The first step was to consult reports to the League of Nations and the United Nations. This documentation is complemented by specific and general works, as well as dissertations and theses that have addressed aspects of this theme. This study focuses on three points. The first part presents the emergence in the context of the conquest and administration of German Togo (1884-1914). The second deals with the post-war restructuring aimed at establishing the mandate (1914-1928) and the final part looks at the reforms aimed at establishing the French mandate (1928-1946).
1. Emergence in the context of the conquest and administration of German Togo (1884-1914)
In the German era, the emergence of the law enforcement and security corps was linked to the process of setting up the administration.
1.1. The creation process
Eager to protect their interests and assert their power through coercion, the colonizers, who were outnumbered, encouraged the emergence of black soldiers in Africa.[2]. Their docility and obedience offered them a guarantee at every level. In German Togo, the use of a black force remained strongly linked to the specific features of German colonialism in Africa. Coming late in the conquest, Germany itself defined its own colonial doctrine (Cornevin 185). This was based on the view that the black man was inferior to the white man. German colonization thus imposed racism, which permeated colonial society. Principles and practices were gradually imposed on blacks: the utmost firmness, fewer friendly relations possible between whites and blacks, unfailing severity, corporal punishment and the death penalty in the event of crime. This vision called for the creation of a police or security force to safeguard the maintenance of order and peace in the colonies. In Togo, from 1884 to 1914, the Germans built up an excellent "Soldatenmaterial", as they called it, to gradually create what is now Togo. To achieve this, they had to dominate and subjugate the populations of Togo, especially those in the northern part, who were fiercely warlike, like the Konkomba or the Kabyè (Cornevin 180-184). The German administration therefore resorted to a method based on brute force and intimidation, because for the Germans, the African "must feel that the white man is strong, otherwise he will never obey him [...]. If he experiences the stick once, he will never feel the need to do it again; he just has to know that if he needs it, the stick is there, ready for action [...]" (Gayibor 22). This doctrine was applied by several administrators, starting with the various imperial commissioners who succeeded one another at the head of Togo. A police force was created in 1885 by the very first, Ernest Falkenthal (1885-1888), in order, among other things, to subjugate the natives to the colonial order. Jesko von Puttkamer (1889-1894) reorganized this armed force into a real military troop, under the command of an officer and trained by a non-commissioned officer (Gayibor 18-19). This was the indigenous police troop or "Politzeitruppe", whose first elements were recruited from the Haoussa of French Nigeria and Niger, renowned for their warlike qualities. Cotocoli cavalrymen won over to the German cause and the Tchokossi were also involved.[3]. From 1894, as they reorganized their troops, the Germans raised their soldiers in the Kété-Kratchi region, where there were a few Haoussa tribes, then in the hinterland of the Gold Coast and in Upper Volta, where the population was made up of Gourounsis and Mossi tribes. Gradually, however, they resorted to their own subjects.[4] notably the Kabyè, Dagomba, Losso and Konkomba of northern Togo, who provided them with excellent soldiers (Maroix 46-47).
The Germans' objective was not to set up a military base. Rather, it was to provide a police force that would help them exercise their authority over the population and ensure easy conquest by force of arms. In short, it was to use its military training to maintain order, peace and security by protecting the territory internally and externally. Initially based in Baguida, then in Zébé, the Politzeitruppe was transferred to Lomé in 1897. The Politzeitruppe was called upon to serve throughout the country, and was therefore distributed to the main districts under the name of Bezirkstruppen. These were recruited and trained on the spot by district administrators from 1898 onwards (Napo 749). Their presence in the localities, especially those most hostile to the colonial presence, was quite important. It enabled the circle administrator to deal with the most urgent situations before calling in his colleague from the nearest circle. In this way, the police troop was able to keep the population in check, especially as they almost never seemed willing to voluntarily carry out the administrator's orders in the context of compulsory labor (420). Initially, enlistment was voluntary for five years, or in the event of a shortfall, call-up for the same year. The forces were maintained by the colony's local budget and used by the civil administration (Maroix 45-46).
On the eve of the First World War, the Germans managed to line up a Politzeitruppe and Bezirkstruppen consisting of 560 black soldiers and around 500 reservists, most of whom were stationed in the interior of the country. All were under the command of German officers and non-commissioned officers. The police force, recruited and trained in this way, used modern firearms to subdue populations hostile to the new authority. These repressive actions certainly favored the Germans, but they ultimately did a disservice to the cause and image of German colonization.
1.2. Our actions
The black force first intervened in Tové before moving on to conquer the hinterland.
Faced with the various abuses perpetrated by the German administration, the people of Tové, located between Kévé and Kpalimé, rose up against the latter. The reason, according to Klose, was that the people of this region never hoisted the German flag. In addition, European visitors were not welcomed by the notables, who complained about the high cost of food and accommodation. In addition, local fetishists were opposed to any idea of civilization and encouraged the population not to buy European products. But the Germans, determined to exert their authority, found a pretext in the person of the botanist Baumann. According to the German authorities, Baumann was not satisfied with the services provided by the local authorities. The authorities dispatched police troops to the scene, where they roughed up the population. During the confrontation, a German soldier was killed. Repression was not long in coming. From March 25 to April 3, 1895, all the villages within a 30 km radius were devastated. The result was around twenty dead, the destruction of several farms and the arrest of several prisoners, most of them women and children (Aduayom et al 493-494). This show of force by the German troops was enough to intimidate the people of the south, who offered no further resistance to the German occupation.
Once established on the coast, the German administration set about occupying the north of the country. The populations of this part of the country did not easily submit to the Germans, as they were particularly warlike peoples living in acephalous societies. This situation prompted the swift intervention of German military forces. What's more, the Germans did not choose the path of negotiation, since they had to occupy these territories quickly enough to prevent the other powers, also engaged in these competitions, from occupying these areas first. The Germans therefore resorted to violent repression to subdue these populations. By this time, the police force was better armed and organized (Gayibor 18). Expeditions were led by Baron Valentin von Massow between 1894 and 1895, by Count Julius von Zech, head of the Kete-Kratchi post in January 1896, and by Dr Gruner in 1897. The expeditionaries brought their troops, equipped with modern weapons, to towns such as Mango, Sokodé and Bassar (Gayibor 18-20), and set about killing the population. Although there were still occasional cases of disobedience, the Germans succeeded in demonstrating their superiority and imposing direct administrative domination in a brutal and ruthless manner. After this phase of conquest, German administration could really get underway.
The success of this administration imposed a certain legislation on the population. Several texts were promulgated recommending obedience to the orders of the authorities. These included the imperial decree of April 22, 1896, which gave administrative powers to circle and station chiefs, as well as to local authorities. This text codified repressive practices and marked the beginning of the indigénat system in Togo. The offences mentioned were mainly those of non-fulfilment of obligations, crimes and misdemeanours against the State and public order, rebellion against State authority, disobedience to administrative authority, offences against the physical integrity of persons and individual freedom, and offences against property (Nabe 253). Those recalcitrant to these regulations bore the brunt of the repression. They were either sentenced to heavy penalties (monetary fines and prison sentences) or corporal punishment of up to 25 strokes. The black policemen were the executors of the beatings, with the famous "one for Kaiser" (Cornevin 192). In order to control the entire population, the administration decided to decentralize these punishments. It was not only the central administrators who organized these punishments, but also the district chiefs, canton chiefs and village chiefs, who were authorized to use force.
The use of black force, albeit to varying degrees, served German interests in one way or another. In this way, the Germans were able to gain respect through terror. Gradually, interest in the black soldier took another turn. As the First World War approached, they were prepared to take part in numerous battles in Africa and Europe. Togo, for its part, bore the brunt of this force, also created and employed by the Allies, determined to conquer the important intercontinental wireless telegraphy installation, one of the stakes of this war in the country.
2. Post-war restructuring to implement the mandate (1914-1928)
World War I broke out in 1914, marking the end of the German presence in Togo. A period of provisional administration was instituted until 1919. During this provisional administration, French actions to maintain order and peace consisted above all in severely repressing unruly populations. In 1922, when the French mandate in Togo was confirmed until 1928, the French presence in this German-speaking (and partly English-speaking) country began to be consolidated, and the policy of land reclamation began to be applied. All this against a backdrop of hesitation and uncertainty. In terms of security, trials were undertaken, especially as France was still unfamiliar with the territory.
2.1. Participation and rebuilding
With war inevitable in the African colonies, William Ponty warned all military authorities in French territories from Dakar. The French in Dahomey took the necessary steps to mobilize. The majority of soldiers enlisted were Africans. France put into practice Lieutenant-Colonel Mangin's idea[5] that African troops accustomed to colonial warfare could be used on European battlefields to counterbalance Germany's military weight. To this end, it established the doctrine of the "Tirailleurs Sénégalais". France used soldiers from its colonial empire, choosing able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 whose mission was to defend their adopted homeland. (Deroo and Champeaux 43; Abdoul 47).
In Dahomey, the French troops under Maroix's military command were made up as follows: three indigenous companies or brigades of Senegalese riflemen, a colonial artillery section of 80 mountain men, a quartermaster's and medical service, a company of European reservists, two groups of Dahomey circle guards, detachments of circle guards, goumiers and partisans from the Haut-Sénégal Niger. A total of eight hundred and fifty regular troops, a thousand auxiliaries and a thousand porters (Maroix 53).
The Gold Coast authorities, for their part, secretly warned by London to prepare for a possible conflict, took strategic measures in all areas. The armed forces numbered 1,584 African soldiers from the Gold Coast regiment of the West African Fontier force.[6]and the 321 men of the Northern territories constabulary, supported by 40 European officers and 330 reservists. According to documents, the British had around 2,200 men ready to fight the Germans (Marguerat 34-35; Maroix 49-50).
In Togo, war was declared on August 5, 1914 and ended three weeks later. It pitted Franco-British forces (better trained as a result of long military campaigns against Ashanti) and Dahomey against German forces in Togo. Most of the fighting took place in the towns of Chra, Agbélouvé, Lilikopé, Kamina and Bafilo, where the German forces were pinned down by French and British forces. The German authorities, victims of a bluff by two English administrators, were forced to withdraw their forces to the interior of the country, allowing the invaders to take Lomé and many other towns without a fight. Togo quickly fell into the hands of the Allies, who had used only 1,000 riflemen, supervised by officers and non-commissioned officers. In reality, while the Germans were no match for the Allied police force, they had difficulty keeping their soldiers in place, many of whom deserted in the face of Allied weapons and strategies. Nor did the Germans expect open warfare in the colonies, preferring negotiations to open attack. In Gold Coast and Dahomey, on the other hand, as we have seen, the British and French authorities had secretly made the necessary arrangements in terms of black forces and equipment. After the German defeat, the Franco-British troop commanders Maroix and Bryant were ordered to divide Togo in two. The British forces occupied Lomé, Kpalimé, Ho, Kété-Kratchi and, in the north, the kingdom of Yendi, with responsibility for running the wharf and railroads, Togo's economic lungs. The French took Aného, Atakpamé and all the rest of the northern circles, which was the least profitable part (Chazelas 117).
The new masters were welcomed almost without difficulty by the people, who saw them as the liberators of their country. So it proved unnecessary to maintain combat troops. The French did, however, leave behind soldiers from the former German troops, who had pledged their loyalty to the new power. In fact, these soldiers, trained to maintain order and peace, obeyed whoever could pay them, whatever flag they were saluting. This was the case of the 7th Company of the IIIrd Battalion of Senegalese Tirailleurs, 75% of whom were Togolese.[7] (Marguerat 110). The regiment comprised 377 men, 342 of them indigenous, stationed in the cercles of Sokodé and Sansanné-Mango. But France, in accordance with article 3 of the mandate, which prohibited the creation of permanent or temporary fortifications and military or naval bases in Togo, reorganized its police force in 1920. An indigenous guard was created on January 7 of the same year. As for the 3rd regiment, it continued to provide territorial security until March 31, 1925, when it was disbanded. The ring guards were a police force under the authority of the Commissaire de la République. Their role was to ensure the maintenance of public safety, the execution of orders and acts of the administrative authority, such as escorting and guarding convoys, guarding administrative buildings, policing communication routes and guarding prisoners.[8].
On June 28, 1925, to compensate for the absence of regular military companies, a decree was issued to organize police forces in the territories under mandate. It stipulated that the indigenous guard was to cooperate with militia formations in policing and securing the territory. The circle guards were divided into two platoons and a detachment. The first platoon was the Lomé platoon, under the command of the troop captain. There was also a platoon in each circle, under the direct orders of the district chiefs. Finally, the third category included a detachment at the disposal of the Lomé police commissioner. The size of each platoon or detachment depended on the size of the district and the requirements of the service (Nabe 265-266).
The presence of this police force was salutary for France, as from the very first moments of its presence in Togo, it had to put down uprisings coming mainly from the populations of the north, which the Germans had had difficulty in pacifying.
2.2. Interventions
While peace prevailed in the south, the same could not be said of the north, where the Germans were unlikely to subdue the entire population. The latter, fiercely attached to their freedom without chieftaincy and to their warrior values, were somewhat opposed to the new power, which did not hesitate to show its strength and superiority. Thus, between 1915 and 1917, several local uprisings were put down with the same ruthless violence as before, if not more so.
Already in March 1915, the French administration had to crack down hard on the Kabyè. Maroix reported:
Lieutenant Vergos (from Dahomey), with a detachment of 36 riflemen, carried out reconnaissance in the Kaburé region, which had been described in previous reports as populated by independent, turbulent mountain people who had never been subject to German authority. (...). A small engagement took place north of the village between our partisans (King Liabo of Sokodé and his warriors) and the inhabitants of Lao, who left 6 dead on the field. Nine prisoners, including the wounded rebel leader, were taken to Sokodé (...). This reconnaissance produced the best impression in the province, and decided the hesitant to submit (Marguerat 125).
On February 25, 1916, there was another skirmish at Tchitchao. There were 25 killed and wounded. The troops, with their firepower out of all proportion to the rebels' bows and arrows, suffered only one skirmisher and four partisans slightly wounded. This show of force broke the rebellion attempt. As for Mango, Clozel stated that "the situation is far from being as we would wish, and will only improve little by little, when the tribes feel that our effective action, supported by a detachment of riflemen, will be tenaciously exerted on them, until their complete obedience is obtained..." (Marguerat 126-127). (Marguerat 126-127). Among the Konkomba, thanks to the reinforcement of the agents, who now knew their duties and performed them well, it would be possible for the cercle commander to better monitor the country (Marguerat 129). A report from Dakar to Paris dated May 15, 1916 concluded: "No good will is to be expected from these very frustrated tribes, naturally inclined to independence. It is only by frequent contact and repeated police rounds that we will succeed in maintaining order and tranquility" (Marguerat 162).
In Tschopowa, a locality located at the time on the Oti but now on the border with Ghana, "the presence of a detachment of riflemen contributed a great deal to reassuring the small villages and, above all, prevented coalitions from re-forming. The populations know that their conduct has been very reprehensible", asserted Captain Goguely in one of his reports in February 1917 (Marguerat 128).
After the establishment of the mandate in Togo, the country became financially autonomous on March 23, 1921. To this end, the administration reorganized the system of benefits. The capitation tax was instituted, stipulating that every adult of working age owed four days of benefits per year for infrastructure maintenance and construction. These benefits could be bought back, but they nevertheless represented a significant burden for the population. The poorest taxpayers, especially in communities without leaders, suffered the most. The inhabitants of these regions, lacking salaried activities, had found themselves deprived of the cash they needed (Assima-Kpatcha 194). Many of these people found refuge in the Gold Coast or British Togo to escape the administration. Others, however, refused to pay the tax. The most prominent of these were the Konkomba, who continued to oppose the administration in one way or another, and fled to the English zone at the slightest hint of a tour by the tax-collecting police (Gayibor 157-158). According to Assima-Kpatcha (195), until the end of Governor Bonnecarrère's stay, the populations of northern Togo were the most subjected to the arbitrary actions of the administrators and the gardes cercles, who spared no effort to force them to perform their duties.
In 1923, a platoon of 35 riflemen, commanded by an officer, was dispatched. Touring the Konkomba country for two months, they disarmed (38 arrows requisitioned) the Konkomba warriors. A military post of 20 men under the command of a European sergeant was then established in the region. In fact, the apparent submission of the Konkomba was short-lived. In April, a platoon of 35 to 39 militiamen commanded by Lieutenant Massu had to be sent in to disarm the region once again. In twenty days, after heavy fighting, the detachment succeeded in removing 200,000 arrows and a ton of other ordnance.[9].
3. Reforms to consolidate the French mandate 1928-1946
From 1928 to 1946, France consolidated its presence in Togo. Indeed, after the trial phase, the need to reorient French colonial policy as a whole became apparent. In the field of policing, France understood the importance of creating new corps capable of protecting its interests in the face of a growing and increasingly critical population.
3.1. Successive reforms
On June 28, 1928, an indigenous militia was created. This militia company was responsible for policing and internal security in conjunction with the native guard. The composition, armament and administration of the militia were determined by decree of the Commissioner of the Republic, subject to the approval of the Ministry of the Colonies. These units reported directly to the Commissaire de la République.[10] and were placed under the command of a capitaine d'infanterie coloniale hors cadre whose duties, powers and prerogatives were set by decree of the commissaire de la république subject to the approval of the ministre des colonies[11]. Native guards and militias were the territory's police force. Of these two forces, only the militia, regarded as an elite troop, had a genuine military role. As early as 1929, it was organized into a militia company comprising a unit organized and armed as a three-section infantry company[12].
In addition to military instruction in accordance with current regulations, the police force received intensive moral and physical training. It had a detachment in Sokodé under the command of a European non-commissioned officer, where it also carried out some of the tasks normally assigned to the native guards. There were also two sections in Lomé, under the authority of the Commissioner of the Republic, but commanded by the Captain Commanding the Police Force, assisted by two European NCOs. Finally, the company was also responsible for recruiting and training the native guard.[13].
In the 1930s, local police and security services were set up in the various French West African territories.[14]. Their main task was to act as the country's political and moral customs. They were to concentrate their actions particularly on ports likely to be chosen by potential troublemakers as places of penetration. In Togo, this service appeared on the territory by decree n°92 dated February 14, 1933[15]following the Lomé women's revolt of January 24-25, 1933. According to J. Gassama (197-198), "The establishment of the security services was an important change in the organization of the colonial police in West Africa. Previously, the forces of law and order had been essentially devoted to policing order and sovereignty, at the expense of urban security and criminal policing".
Subsequently, the local decrees of August 9, 1938 and December 27, 1941 perfected the organization of this service, enabling it to meet the needs of the time. The police and security service comprised central services at the territory's capital and external services in the various centers.[16].
At the time of mobilization[17]only the militia company[18] was put on a war footing, but a second company was also formed. Command of the whole was assigned to the military commander of Dahomey, who became military commander of Dahomey-Togo.[19]. On December 31, 1944, the2nd militia company was disbanded, while the1st company became the Togo Police Force Company, comprising 4 European officers, 13 European non-commissioned officers and 302 Africans. All these troops were again under the effective command of the captain commanding the Togo police force.[20].
On September 17, 1942, the gendarmerie service was created by decree no. 516/APA and entrusted to three European military personnel, who took up duty at the Lomé police station in November of the same year. They came from the AOF gendarmerie detachment in Dakar. This number was not increased during the years 1943-1944. In 1945, following decree no. 463/APA dated August 23, the gendarmerie service was reorganized and its staff increased, and set up in three cercles in the interior: Kpalimé, Aného and Sokodé. In all, there were 7 European officers or gendarmes and 5 African auxiliary gendarmes.[21].
To sum up, until 1946, the territory consisted of three groups of security forces. These were the military forces themselves, made up of the2nd company of the Dahomey Sud-Togo autonomous battalion stationed in Lomé and a corps of military circle guards; a gendarmerie service and a civilian police force known as the police and security service.
3.2. Crisis commitments
As part of the development of the territory, law enforcement officers were involved in implementing the policy of colonizing new lands. This was a policy of relocating populations to the still open lands of central Togo, to relieve the overpopulation of the Kabiye country. These agents were charged with carrying out colonial orders, for although there were volunteers later on, the beginning was forced. Indeed, mistrust prevailed, as did the brutality of the local authorities in appointing the so-called volunteers, half of whom fled as soon as they regained their freedom (Gayibor 150). In the same field, former soldiers distributed seeds for certain products imposed by the colonizers, such as groundnuts, cotton, yam cuttings and selected seedlings for coffee, cocoa and palm groves. They also supervised their planting (Cornevin 75).
This policy of setting up economic equipment had also led the administration to exploit low-paid native labor. Under these conditions, it reorganized the benefit system in 1922. Adults were obliged to perform four days of compulsory work. But these benefits were redeemable. Despite this, she resorted to force to exploit the claimants, who had paid their benefits in cash. In the cercle of Mango in 1928, it was reported that all claimants had redeemed their benefits, and at the same time that the Lamba still performed part of them. In Atakpamé in 1929, double exploitation was also noted, as the so-called roadworks carried out by volunteers were in fact forced labor carried out under duress (Assima-Kpatcha 297). Law enforcement officers were also employed to supervise infrastructure construction work. According to padaha (70), General Massu placed two or three militiamen per site, who lived until the work was completed. With these militiamen, General Massu built a total of nine sites between 1935 and 1936 during the pacification of the Konkomba. This was also the case for 35 policemen who, after having served as security forces on the Nuatja (Notsè)-Blitta railway section under the Germans, had been transferred to Atakpamé by the French to oversee the construction of the Atakpamé-Badou road.[22].
After Bonnecarrère's departure in 1931, Togo began to feel the after-effects of the 1929 crisis. The new commissioner, de Guise, had to manage the effects in Togo. To cope with the consequences of the crisis on the Togolese economy, the local administration had to take highly unpopular measures, including raising old taxes and creating new ones in 1933. Despite the intervention of Lomé's notables, who were opposed to these new decisions, the administration refused to reverse its decision. Faced with the situation created by the crisis: wages cut by 50%, the collapse of resources, unemployment, social unrest, a fall in the cost of living, etc., added to the increase in taxation. The demonstrators, who had lost confidence in the notables, took to the streets of Lomé on January 24, 1933, following the arrest of Duawo members.[23]. (d'Almeida-Ekué 39-45). Such was the origin of the Lomé riots of 1933. To bring the demonstrators under control, on January 24 de Guise urgently requested that a platoon of militiamen working on the Agbonou railroad be sent to Lomé. He requisitioned Lomé's police commander and two militia platoons. The next day, the unrest resumed. To restore calm to the city of Lomé, a section of Dahomean riflemen was called in, followed by a 170-strong company of riflemen from Côte d'Ivoire (d'Almeida-Ekué 62-64).
3.3. Retraining after military service
In addition to their role of helping to maintain peace and security, some police officers were given the opportunity to learn a trade. With this qualification, they were placed at the disposal of district commanders for use in road maintenance, post office work, and other jobs such as roadmender, bricklayer, woodworker, ironworker, tailor, shoemaker, etc.). This advantage facilitated their return to civilian life once their service was over.
On the other hand, soldiers, like civil servants and traditional chiefs, also constituted a direct link between power and the population. This socio-professional category therefore enjoyed privileges in society. The authorities sometimes did not hesitate to thank them for their loyalty. For example, after the First World War in Togo, they enjoyed a special status, being excluded from the indigénat regime and given the opportunity to obtain French citizenship. Most of them were awarded the Legion of Honor or the Military Medal (Wiyao 16-17). This privileged position gave them access to certain traditional posts in the interests of the administration. These included positions such as canton and village chiefs. This was the case in Sokodé when former German policemen were appointed village chiefs. Indeed, in 1917, the Sokodé cercle commander appointed 22 policemen who had fought in 1914 as village chiefs to replace the traditional village chiefs, whose authority had been considerably weakened since agitators and leaders of the pacification movements had tried to annihilate them (Marguérat 129). This was also the case in the Mango cercle. The Tchokossi of Mango traditionally had royal families whose succession was from father to son, except in cases of particular handicap (Cornevin 88). However, in 1936, this traditional principle was overturned by the appointment of a military officer. On May 2, 1936, the Mango cercle commander appointed tirailleur Sergeant Alika as chef canton d'Atolé. He declared: "This sergeant of the native guard can succeed thanks to his sharp mind and personal authority. He knows how to read and write, and could therefore be of some service". (Badanzo 37)
Conclusion
In the light of the foregoing, it would appear that law enforcement and security officers constituted an inexhaustible reservoir of men used by the colonial powers to bully and dominate the populations of their colonies. This force, which appeared as part of the installation of the German administration, heroised during the First World War, served to consolidate the French presence in Togo under mandate. This situation is indicative of its key position within the colonial state. A privilege it still holds today, even within independent African states, which cannot afford to relinquish this essential force in the shaping of their societies.
Sources and works cited
Sources
ANT-Lomé, 2APA Cercle d'Atakpamé, dossier 41, indigenous recruitment (1912-1948).
Annual reports to the League of Nations, 1921, 1935.
Annual reports to the UN: 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957.
Works quoted
Almeida (d)-Ekué, Silivi. La révolte des Loméennes, January 24-25, 1933. NEA du Togo, 1992.
Aduayom, Adimado et al. " Le refus de la colonisation: de la pénétration à la seconde guerre mondiale", Histoire des Togolais, edited by Nicoué Lodjou Gayibor, Presses de l'UL, 2005, pp. 491-556.
Assima-Kpatcha, Essoham. Travail et salariat au Togo français (1914-1939). PhD thesis, University of Lomé, 2004.
Badanzo, B. Y. Le cercle de Mango dans l'entre-deux-guerres (1920-1939). Master's thesis, University of Benin, 1995.
Barandao, Kufoma. L'armée togolaise: origine et évolution (unpublished manuscript).
Champeaux, Antoine. "Tirailleurs de la République française", Forces noires des puissances coloniales européennes, edited by Antoine Champeaux, Eric Deroo and Janos Riesz, Lavauzelle, 2009, pp. 29-38.
Chazelas, Victor. African territories under French mandate: Togo and Cameroon. Société d'Edition Géographique, maritime et coloniale, 1931.
Conombo, Joseph. Issoufou. Souvenirs de guerre d'un "Tirailleur Sénégalais", L'Harmattan, 1989.
Cornevin, Robert. Togo: from its origins to the present day. Académie des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, 1988.
Deroo, Eric. and Champeaux, Antoine. La force noire: gloire et infortunes d'une légende coloniale, Tallandier, 2006.
Gayibor, Nicoué. Lodjou. Europeans in the Gulf of Guinea: from the 16th to the 19th century. PUB, 1991.
........... Le Togo sous domination coloniale (1884-1960), Les presses de l'UB, 1997.
Glasman, Joël. Dressed bodies in Togo. Khartala-Les Afriques, 2014.
Kponton, Ginette. La décolonisation du Togo (1940-1960), PhD thesis in history, Université de Provence, 1977.
Marguerat, Yves. "L'occupation franco-britannique (septembre 1914-septembre 1920). Histoire des Togolais, edited by Nicoué Lodjou Gayibor, Presses de l'UL, 2005, pp. 101-175.
.........Laguerre d'août 1914 au Togo: histoire militaire et politique d'un épisode décisif pour l'identité nationale togolaise, Collection " Patrimoine " n°14, Presses de l'UL, 2004.
.......... The 1914 war in Togo and its consequences. L'Harmattan, 2019.
Maroix, General. Togo: a country of French influence. Larose-Editeurs, 1938.
Nabe, Bammoy. "Le maintien de l'ordre et la paix coloniale", Histoire des Togolais, edited by Nicoué Lodjou Gayibor, Presses de l'UL, 2005, pp. 249-281.
Napo, Ali. Togo in the German era. Editions Saint-Augustin Afrique, 2020.
........ Togo in the German era (1884-1914). PhD thesis, 1995.
Padaha, M, Les forces de maintien de l'ordre au Togo sous administration française (1920-1960). Master's thesis, University of Lomé, 2006.
Riesz, Jonas. "La 'force noire' dans les colonies allemandes", Forces noires des puissances coloniales européennes, edited by Antoine Champeaux, Eric Deroo and Jonas Riesz, Lavauzelle, 2009, pp. 41-72.
Sow, Abdoul. Des tirailleurs sénégalais se racontent. L'Harmattan-Sénégal, 2018.
Taillac, (de) Pierre. "L'armée noire anglaise", Forces noires des puissances coloniales européennes, edited by Antoine Champeaux, Eric Deroo and Jonas Riesz, Lavauzelle, 2009, pp. 73-79.
Tété-Adjalogo, Têtêvi Godwin. Histoire du Togo: la palpitante quête de 'Ablodé (1940-1960), Collection Libre Afrique, 2000.
Wiyao, Evalo. January 13, 1963 January 13, 1967: why? Les NEA du Togo, 2001.
How to cite this article:
MLA: Lassey, Agnélé. "Le corps des agents de maintien de l'ordre au Togo: création, réorganisations, rôles (1884-1946)." Uirtus 1.2. (December 2021): 561-581.
§ University of Lomé / [email protected]
[1]It's true that the other powers had also committed to recruiting black soldiers, but France really relied on this black force to serve its interests in French-speaking Africa.
[2] Indeed, from the 15th century onwards, Europeans set out to conquer Africa and became involved in a number of commercial activities, including the slave trade and, later, legal trade (Gayibor 8-10). To carry out all these activities, they needed to recruit African auxiliaries for the trading posts set up along the coast. These included interpreters, laborers and African sailors. The expansion of the slave trade opened the way to increasingly fierce competition from the European powers. The latter, eager to protect their commercial and naval installations and ensure their prestige in the eyes of local powers, called on European soldiers, who were unfortunately decimated by the climate and tropical pathologies. The idea of recruiting and training black troops gradually gained ground, to the point where in 1799 a corps of African volunteers was reconstituted. But in the mid-19th century, the race for colonies led the English and above all the French to make massive use of these African soldiers. These soldiers, whether recruited in Africa or Madagascar, were initially named according to their origin. For example, tirailleurs sénégalais (Senegalese riflemen), tirailleurs haoussas (Hausa riflemen), tirailleurs gabonais (Gabonese riflemen), tirailleurs malgaches (Madagascan riflemen), tirailleurs somalis (Somalis), etc. For a few years, the term tirailleurs coloniaux (colonial riflemen) was even used. However, it was decided to standardize the names of units recruited from Africa, and to call them all "Senegalese" as a reminder of their origins. This is why all these black troops, whether of Senegalese origin or not, were called and kept the generic name given by their creator "Tirailleurs Sénégalais", especially as Senegal was the first country to supply black soldiers[2]. As for the term Tirailleur, it originally designated a "combatant with a certain freedom of maneuver who fires outside the ranks". This appellation served not only to mask the soldier's profession in the army, but also, and more often, his real origin (Deroo and Champeaux 25; Champeaux 30).
[3]The Germans used their help to subdue the northern peoples who opposed German penetration of the North.
[4]The French and English, dissatisfied with this recruitment of soldiers in their colony for Togo, objected (Maroix 46).
[5] It was in 1908 that Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mangin proposed greater use of black soldiers, as the numerous colonial expeditions were costing the lives of European soldiers and were upsetting public opinion. Through several articles, fact-finding missions and, finally, the publication of his book La force noire in 1910, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Mangin extolled the importance of this black force. Relying on France's demographic crisis in the face of a much more populous Germany, he proposed recruiting 5,000 riflemen over four years, bringing the total to 20,000, given that 10,000 were already serving abroad and 10,000 were to be raised to form an intervention reserve. He also advocated a call-up of young Africans between the ages of twenty-eight, which would mobilize 500,000 soldiers. Moreover, these reliable troops were less expensive than European units, and could be deployed in North Africa, where, at the request of the colonists and out of mistrust of Islam, large forces were maintained that were lacking on the metropolitan borders (Deroo and Champeaux 43).
[6]According to Maroix (49), this regiment was stationed in the colony of Sierra Leone, with a main section in Freetown. En route for the Gold Coast on August 23, 1914, the soldiers arrived only after the end of operations conducted entirely by French troops and active Gold Coast forces.
[7] The same was true of the British, who in May 1915 recruited some fifty former German Togo soldiers to create a small police force, trained and led until 1917 by assistant administrator Angus C. Johnstone. Johnstone, which functioned perfectly to maintain an order that no one thought of disturbing (Marguerat 110).
[8 ] Rapport du Ministère des colonies; des territoires occupés au Togo, 1921, p. 12.
[9 ] SDN Report 1935, p. 39-40.
[10 ] In the event of mobilization, the militia company, supplemented by the call-up of reserves formed by former soldiers in residence in the territory, came under the orders of the General Commanding General of the AOF troops (Report to the UN, 1947, p. 31).
[11 ] Report to the UN, 1947, p. 31.
[12 ] Report to the UN, 1947, p. 32.
[13]SDN Report 1925, p. 35.
[14] In 1922, to protect the colonial administration from new threats that could weaken its authority, Dakar created a Central Security and General Intelligence Service for the French West Indies.
[15 ] Report to the UN, 1947, p. 33.
[16 ] Report to the UN, 1947, p. 33.
[17 ] Despite the defense of the mandate over Togo, the French recruited soldiers from North Togo into the colonial army, as they joined from Dahomey or Côte d'Ivoire. This recruitment intensified during the Second World War, when many young people from northern Togo crossed the border to join the French army, especially in Dahomey, as volunteers. Kponton (33) gives a figure of around 3,000 volunteers. Other Togolese volunteers took part in the Indochina and Algerian wars. But most were demobilized at the end of the war (Tété-Adjalogo 62).
[18 ] As in the German era, the French, having appreciated the most combative elements in the campaign against the Germans, used the same peoples - the Kabyè, Losso, Moba, Bassar etc. - to form the police forces. At first, these forces were recruited from the ranks of former riflemen, with or without rank, simply by signing up. Later, volunteers were recruited, preferably from the north of the country. This was confirmed by the Bourgeois Gavardin inspection mission (1940-1941), and corroborated by the commissioner of the republic at the time, who stated that of the 664 militiamen in the Lomé militia in 1941, 70% were Togolese, 63% from the north and 7% from the south. The rest were foreigners. They were often former tirailleurs from Dahomey, or Mossi from the Upper Ivory Coast (now Upper Volta). There were 57 in 1932 and 14 foreigners in the Togolese militia in 1941. In 1920, the native guard included 3 warrant officers, 10 sergeants, 20 corporals and 217 guards. In 1937, there were 233 guards, 35 senior police officers and 184 indigenous military officers (Barandao 17).
[19 ] Report to the UN, 1947, p. 31-34.
[20 ] Report to the UN, 1947, p. 32.
[21 ] Report to the UN, 1947, p. 37.
[22] ANT-Lomé, 2APA Cercle d'Atakpamé, dossier 41, indigenous recruitment (1912-1948).
[23] This was an association critical of the administration. Its leaders had succeeded in gaining the trust of the population by informing them of the repercussions of the crisis and the administration's decisions. The administration, believing it had put an end to the problem, arrested the two Duawo leaders (d'Almeida-Ekué 35).
